Some history to note- FDR's speech for that address was NOT written by any of his speechwriters... he dictated it directly, and there was only ONE edit:
He originally wrote it as "A day that will live in history".
He replaced the word HISTORY with INFAMY.
It was after this address to Congress, and it's radio broadcast across the country, that Winston Churchill made a request to FDR, to allow something that had never been allowed before- To allow a foriegn dignitary to make an address to a joint meeting of the United States Congress.
The request was made well-prior TO December 7th, it was not until AFTER the attach that FDR acquiesced.
A few other facts:
US signals intelligence was generally aware of the impending attack- they had been monitoring IJN radio traffic, and had figured out that there was a plan of some sort afoot.
The radar station on the east side of the island detected the incoming attach sortie, but had initially thought it an incoming group of US aircraft. Once they'd realized what it was, relay of the contact over to the harbor command was not taken particularly seriously.
In Washington, the Japanese counselate was well aware that there would be an attack. They were actively participating in negotiations, but it was a facade- they were instructed to do so as a delay measure. They were to deliver a declaration of war in such a way as to make the notification just a few minutes before the actual attack, but due to a variety of factors, the declaration deliverly didn't occur until AFTER.
Admiral Yamamoto was the key planner of the attack, but he did so in protest. As a diplomatic attache, he had been to the US many times, travelled about, and even studied in American schools. His English was very good, his understanding of aviation and naval engineering was exceptional, and he understood resources very well. He made it very clear to the IJN command that Japan could NOT hope to 'win', the best they could do, is attack hard, take control of the pacific resources, and HOPE that the US would sue for peace, but he identified very clearly that the 'best' they could expect, is that the IJN would have control of the pacific theatre for about 18 months or so, after which, the tide would turn.
"In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and
Great Britian I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then,
if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success"
He advised against the attack, but higher powers within the IJN, as well as the IJ Army, did not agree with his assessment. From an internal perspective, Yamamoto was a 'marked man'... he was very disliked by the Imperial Japanese Army leadership. There was a natural rift between the army and navy... that rift was probably one of the greatest weaknesses affecting Japan's capacity... right along with resource limitiations. IF Yamamoto had not been sent to sea to be a naval commander... if he'd been kept home to be a command figure on the home islands, he would have been assassinated by political operators within the Imperial Japanese Army... Most likely, under the direct order of Tojo.
Many will be familiar with a short note he passed to one of his contemporaries immediately after the attack:
"I believe we have awakened a sleeping giant"
It was a terrible attack, and later in the war, he was removed from the war by a very well planned and executed air action. He was a very intelligent man, and like Robert E. Lee, I believe that he really, really didn't want to have anything to do with war.
Here's a few more notable (and quite eloquent) quotes that illustrate his disposition:
"A brilliant man would find a way to NOT fight a war." (after being complimented on the brilliance of his attack plan).
"A military man can scarcely prid himself on having 'smitten a sleeping enemy'- it is more a matter of shame, simply, for the one smitten. I would rather you made your appraisal after seeing what the enemy does, since it is certain that, angered and outraged, he will soon launch a determined counterattack.
"The mindless rejoicing at home is really appalling- it makes me fear that the first blow against Tokyo will make them wilt at once... I only wish that [the USA] had aklso had, say, three carriers at Hawaii" (this was excellent foreshadowing, when 16 B25 bombers lifted off the Hornet and introduced Tokyo to their first taste of American ire)
Follow this with notes on Emporer Hirohito, who was villified on our side of the ocean... a young boy when the title fell upon him... he became Tojo's puppet. He was actually a pacifist, but due to Tojo's muscle organization, Hirohito didn't actually command any power. It wasn't until after the war had been going on for quite some time, and the young men weren't coming back home, that the 'middle management' of Japan started to pull away from Tojo's grip. At that point, he was constantly avoiding Tojo's dagger... right up to the end, there were factions trying to assasinate Hirohito, particularly to prevent his address to be broadcast to the people of Japan to cease all fighting.
Here's a few quotes that paint a good picture of who that man was:
[re. the 'success' of extending their influence across the pacific]
"The fruits of victory are tumbling into our mouths too quickly"
[After the war, on explaining the key difference between cultures:]
"They [Americans] do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emporor is Divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races"
[re. terms of unconditional surrender, to his own people:]
"We have resolved to endure the unendurable, and suffer what is insufferable"
"I made efforts to swallow tears and to protect the species of the Japanese nation."
After the war:
"You can't imagine how much more work I had, when I was a god"
"All men are brothers, like the seas throughout the world- so why do winds and waves clash so fiercely everywhere?"
War is a terrible, terrible thing. When diplomats fail, soldiers prevail... but the price is gruesome.
We must study hour history to the greatest detail, so that the lessons we learned THEN, are not forgotten, and repeated.
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DMiller wrote:
